First I have a general question: mserver is started through xinetd, and xinetd has
the options "only_from" and "no_access". This is equivalent to the tcp_wrapper
functionality. Why not using this? It's possible without changing anything in midas.
Or am I missing anything?

If that does not work for some reason, here are some thought from my side:

- We don't have much of a problem with malicious hackers, but with institute-wide
security checking. Hackers are only interested in mechanisms where they can obtain
control over thousands of machines (like breaking ssh etc.). The few midas machines
are not a good target for them. But even at PSI there are security scans, which try
to connect to various ports and can crash systems, so I agree that something needs
to be done.

- Whatever we do, it should be consistent on linux and windows and should not rely
on external packages, since I don't want to get into dependencies there.

- I see that both having the security information in the ODB or having them in
external files can be advantageous. There is certainly the aspect of restoring old
ODBs, or keeping several experiments (ODB) on one machine consistent. On the other
hand storing data in the ODB might me liked by people who are familiar with this
concept, and want to change things though mhttpd for example.

- Having said all that, it would make sense to me to write a simple central routine
access_allowed(), which takes the IP address of a remote client wanting to connect,
and return true or false. This routine should read /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny
and interprete it, but only the section for midas, and maybe only a subset of the
functionality there (we probably don't need NIS netgroup names, external files and
spawn commands there). If the files /etc/hosts.x do not contain anything about midas
or are not preset (Windows!), the routine should look in the ODB under
/experiment/security/mserver/hosts.allow and /experiment/security/mserver/hosts.deny
and use that information instead of the files.

- We probably need different mechanisms for mserver and for mhttpd. The mserver
clients are usually only a few programs like the front-ends, while one may want to
control an experiment over mhttpd from much more machines. So we should establish a
second ACL for mhttpd. The already present "/experiment/security/allowed hosts" for
mhttpd should be converted into "/Experiment/Security/mhttpd/hosts.allow" and the
function access_allowed() should be used to interprete that, so that we only need to
write it once.