> > - mhttpd cannot serve /etc/passwd by default as "/" is forbidden in file names added to /Custom/Path.
> You do this with a simple
> if (custom_path == "/")
> which does work but does not cover cases such as
> "/./"

Hmm... and this is just fine. Since I do not allow "/" in the file name, they can
set the resource path to any alias for the root filesystem, but they cannot
get to "/etc/passwd" unless they run mhttpd in /etc or set /Custom/Path to "/etc".

All these cases are not normal use of mhttpd, not "oops, I made a mistake"
and not "I will kludge my paths just for today just for this one experiment". They
have to make an explicit decision to break the security.

These days, I am thinking that we should not try to prevent all insecure uses of midas,
but at least we should make the default configuration secure and disallow some of the more
obviously insecure configurations (i.e. do not permit password protection without https).

Take the root password as an example. Empty root passwd is not permitted, but
root password set to "root" is allowed (some password tools may throw a warning).

>
> Still, in my opinion we should not have a path in the ODB. The custom path should be hard-wired and combined with symbolic links if necessary. The custom HTML pages under /Custom in the ODB have to be scanned for ".."s.
> 

Stefan, we already allow execution of arbitrary commands via ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command".

So for all practical purposes, somebody with access to the mhttpd web pages also has shell access
to the user account running mhttpd.

K.O.