> > - mhttpd cannot serve /etc/passwd by default as "/" is forbidden in file names added to /Custom/Path.
> You do this with a simple
> if (custom_path == "/")
> which does work but does not cover cases such as
> "/./"

Hmm... and this is just fine. Since I do not allow "/" in the file name, they can
set the resource path to any alias for the root filesystem, but they cannot
get to "/etc/passwd" unless they run mhttpd in /etc or set /Custom/Path to "/etc".

All these cases are not normal use of mhttpd, not "oops, I made a mistake"
and not "I will kludge my paths just for today just for this one experiment". They
have to make an explicit decision to break the security.

These days, I am thinking that we should not try to prevent all insecure uses of midas,
but at least we should make the default configuration secure and disallow some of the more
obviously insecure configurations (i.e. do not permit password protection without https).

Take the root password as an example. Empty root passwd is not permitted, but
root password set to "root" is allowed (some password tools may throw a warning).

>
> Still, in my opinion we should not have a path in the ODB. The custom path should be hard-wired and combined with symbolic links if necessary. The custom HTML pages under /Custom in the ODB have to be scanned for ".."s.
> 

Stefan, we already allow execution of arbitrary commands via ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command".

So for all practical purposes, somebody with access to the mhttpd web pages also has shell access
to the user account running mhttpd.

K.O.

> First, I did not propose to give up the /Custom tree in the ODB, sorry for the misunderstanding. We still need it in order to display the menu with the custom pages at the left side navigation bar. In principle all can stay like it is, except we remove /Custom/Path and rewrite the file server to restrict it only 
> to the two mentioned directories.
> 
> Second, to keep the compatibility with running experiments, we have to make the move over as simply as possible. Thomas proposed a "deprecated" mhttpd command line option. As an alternative, I propose to make a symbolic link from <exptab>/resources to where the old /Custom/Path was pointing 
> to. This should work as well, and we don't have to implement a parameter in mhttpd.

That sounds fine, as long as it is clearly documented.

> Third, the /Custom/Path should really go away. We are all concerned that people can read security critical files from the whole file system. To read those files, people have to access to mhttpd, so they have to know at least the authentication credentials to pass the Apache firewall in front of mhttpd or 
> whatever. This means they have access to the ODB, and then they can simply change /Custom/Path to "/" and voila - they have again access to /etc/passwd. This is why I propose symbolic links on the file system. This area is much better protected than the ODB, since people have to physically log into 
> a machine to change it.

Yes, I agree that /Custom/Path should go away.

Cheers,
Thomas

> First, I did not propose to give up the /Custom tree in the ODB, sorry for the misunderstanding.
> We still need it in order to display the menu with the custom pages at the left side navigation bar.
> In principle all can stay like it is, except we remove /Custom/Path and rewrite the file server to restrict it only 
> to the two mentioned directories.
> 

We have several large installations at TRIUMF that use the old-style custom pages - MUSR, BNMR/BNQR, TITAN (and more?) -
none of these experiments are going away any time soon and none of these custom pages are rewriting themselves.

So, I think we are stuck with supporting old-style custom pages in the short and in the long term, unless we decide to abandon these existing users of MIDAS.

And the old-style custom pages come with the old-style scheme of keeping file names in ODB. Removing
it will require experiments to reorganize their filesystems (different custom pages may come from different
git repositories on different disks - not trivially placable all in the same directory).

Plus some people (including myself) like to have some things explicitly specified - I want to know that
this page loads this file without having to guess where in a search path it came from today.

>
> Thomas proposed a "deprecated" mhttpd command line option.
>

"deprecated" does not work.

"we removed it because it stopped working and we cannot fix it" works,
"do not use it for new experiments" works (until a user comes back with "but I really like this feature!")
"we will remove it at an unknown future date because we think nobody should use it" does not work.

>
> As an alternative, I propose to make a symbolic link from <exptab>/resources to where the old /Custom/Path was pointing 
> to. This should work as well, and we don't have to implement a parameter in mhttpd.
> 

All experiments at TRIUMF that use old-style custom pages do not use /Custom/Path. In the new scheme
of things, setting /Custom/Path to anything other than blank will break them.

>
> Third, the /Custom/Path should really go away.
>

For once, I agree. /Custom/Path did not exist and should not have been added.

> We are all concerned that people can read security critical files from the whole file system.

Only in the default configuration and in configurations that would realistically used by an experiment. This
excludes the case of "/Custom/Path" set to "/etc" - not the default and unlikely to be used by any experiment.

> To read those files, people have to access to mhttpd, so they have to know at least the authentication credentials to pass the Apache firewall in front of mhttpd or 
> whatever. This means they have access to the ODB, and then they can simply change /Custom/Path to "/" and voila - they have again access to /etc/passwd.

Nope. They have to set /Custom/Path to "/etc" or start mhttpd under "/etc" or point /Custom/Path to a symlink to /etc. (mhttpd will not serve "etc/passwd", "/" in the filename is not permitted).

> This is why I propose symbolic links on the file system.

Some people dislike symlinks.
Some filesystems do not implement symlinks. (should we prevent mhttpd from running on the ms-dos fat filesystem "just because"?)

> This area is much better protected than the ODB, since people have to physically log into 
> a machine to change it.

Nope. You can create symlinks from mhttpd by putting running the "ln -s" command from ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command"

K.O.

> > > - mhttpd cannot serve /etc/passwd by default as "/" is forbidden in file names added to /Custom/Path.
> > You do this with a simple
> > if (custom_path == "/")
> > which does work but does not cover cases such as
> > "/./"
> 
> Hmm... and this is just fine. Since I do not allow "/" in the file name, they can
> set the resource path to any alias for the root filesystem, but they cannot
> get to "/etc/passwd" unless they run mhttpd in /etc or set /Custom/Path to "/etc".

Just set 

/Custom/Path = /./ 

which is allowed right now and then access etc/passwd, which translates to /./etc/passwd and then you get the password file. 

We should make up our mind:

1) We trust each user who has access to mhttpd. The accessing /etc/passwd is not a problem and I don't understand all the fuzz we had recently. Why all the recent work?

2) We do not trust users connected via mhttpd, but we trust users who can log in to the online machine. If we do not trust users having access to mhttpd, then it does not make sense in my mind to fix one hole and keep a few other open. You correctly 
mentioned the /Programs/xxx/Start command, and there are a few others, like executing scripts directly. Either we fix all (known) holes or we don't bother.

3) We do not trust users who can log in to the online machine, since they can just cat /etc/passwd. But then why give them access to the online machine?

So which of the three options would you prefer?

 
> All these cases are not normal use of mhttpd, not "oops, I made a mistake"
> and not "I will kludge my paths just for today just for this one experiment". They
> have to make an explicit decision to break the security.

Accessing /etc/passwd is an explicit decision as well and does not come by "oops, I made a mistake"

> These days, I am thinking that we should not try to prevent all insecure uses of midas,
> but at least we should make the default configuration secure and disallow some of the more
> obviously insecure configurations (i.e. do not permit password protection without https).

Thanks to the nice public discussion here on the forum (and I still think this is the correct way to discuss these things), all forum subscribers are now aware of several security holes. So either they are evil, then we have to fix all (known) holes. Or we trust 
them, then we don't care.

> Stefan, we already allow execution of arbitrary commands via ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command".
> 
> So for all practical purposes, somebody with access to the mhttpd web pages also has shell access
> to the user account running mhttpd.

Agree. And this is on the same level as accessing /etc/passwd. So either we allow all of them or none of them. Something in between absolutely does not make sense to me.

To shorten the discussion: I think what we do right now does not make sense, but I do not insist of changing it. If people want it like that, fine with me. Just a waste of your time fixing the "/" path.

Stefan

> Just set 
> /Custom/Path = /./ 
> which is allowed right now and then access etc/passwd, which translates to /./etc/passwd and then you get the password file.

Nope. http://localhost:8080/etc/passwd yields this error regardless of the value of /Custom/Path: MIDAS error: Invalid custom file name 'etc/passwd' contains '/' or '/'

> We should make up our mind:
> 1) We trust each user who has access to mhttpd. The accessing /etc/passwd is not a problem and I don't understand all the fuzz we had recently. Why all the recent work?

Stefan, "/etc/passwd" is a stand-in for "$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa". Surely stealing the ssh keys is a very bad thing.

> 2) We do not trust users connected via mhttpd, but we trust users who can log in to the online machine.
> If we do not trust users having access to mhttpd, then it does not make sense in my mind to fix one hole and keep a few other open.
> You correctly mentioned the /Programs/xxx/Start command, and there are a few others, like executing scripts directly. Either we fix all (known) holes or we don't bother.

I see a distinction between accessing a magic URL (a read-only operation) and a targeted attack (editing odb, etc).

In the first case, it's a script-kiddie "let's try http:blah/etc/passwd, http:blah/../etc/passwd, etc, bingo!).

In the second case, if it's a targeted attack, forget about it. If an attacker wants in, they will get it. Have secure backups, etc.

Plus eventually we will restore the user access controls - read-only access, operator access (can start runs, edit history plots) and Q access. Only
this very last one would allow editing of ODB.

> 3) We do not trust users who can log in to the online machine, since they can just cat /etc/passwd. But then why give them access to the online machine?

ssh foo cat /etc/passwd is normal
http://foo/etc/passwd is not normal

> So which of the three options would you prefer?

I try to think simple:
if something worked yesterday and works today, let it be
if we add something new, it should not be obviously insecure

> 
> Thanks to the nice public discussion here on the forum (and I still think this is the correct way to discuss these things), all forum subscribers are now aware of several security holes.
> So either they are evil, then we have to fix all (known) holes. Or we trust  them, then we don't care.
> 

Here is the elephant in the room. mhttpd has never gone through a security audit. It's easy to find
security holes (buffer overflows) can be easily found by "grep sprintf".

To me, this means that access to mhttpd always must be password-protected.

Password protection requires https.

The built-in mongoose https server is as safe as the mongoose library (probably yes) and the openssl library (yes-ish, see openbsd libressl)

The external apache https takes a few minutes to setup, as the "industry standard", it is trusted to be safe.

>
> > Stefan, we already allow execution of arbitrary commands via ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command".
> This is on the same level as accessing /etc/passwd. So either we allow all of them or none of them. Something in between absolutely does not make sense to me.
>

Ok, we have identified our difference of opinion:

I think serving arbitrary files over http is a bad idea (on general principles)
and you think it is okey because there are other ways to get to those files.

Fair enough.

K.O.

P.S. Hmm... not fair enough.

I am now thinking about web-browser security -
suppose some kind of cross-site or cross-tab exploit comes out and suddenly
arbitrary web pages loaded from facebook.com (or worse) gain access
to the mhttpd web pages if both are open at the same time.

We may be still protected by obscurity and they presumably do not know how to change
things in odb, but I think it is a good idea to protect ourselves at least
against drive-by attacks (try http:blah/etc/passwd, try http:blah/../etc/passwd, etc,
replace /etc/passwd by some other secret file, try again - think  ssh keys, etc).

K.O.

I stop the discussion here because it goes in circles. We can't convince each others, so somebody has to give up, and that's me.

> We have several large installations at TRIUMF that use the old-style custom pages - MUSR, BNMR/BNQR, TITAN (and more?) -
> none of these experiments are going away any time soon and none of these custom pages are rewriting themselves.

Then you have a problem. Last time I told you that the new URL scheme breaks parts of the custom pages, especially the ones containing GIF images with labels on it. You then said "these experiments have to bite the bullet and 
change it", and I proceeded. Now you tell me that this will not happen. So please be aware that these experiments do have a problem and probably are stuck with an older midas version.

> > This area is much better protected than the ODB, since people have to physically log into 
> > a machine to change it.
> 
> Nope. You can create symlinks from mhttpd by putting running the "ln -s" command from ODB "/Programs/xxx/Start Command"

You can also set a start command "cat /etc/passwd | sendmail me@triumf.ca" and you get the password file ;-)

Stefan

> > We have several large installations at TRIUMF that use the old-style custom pages - MUSR, BNMR/BNQR, TITAN (and more?) -
> > none of these experiments are going away any time soon and none of these custom pages are rewriting themselves.
> 
> Then you have a problem. Last time I told you that the new URL scheme breaks parts of the custom pages, especially the ones containing GIF images with labels on it. You then said "these experiments have to bite the bullet and 
> change it", and I proceeded. Now you tell me that this will not happen. So please be aware that these experiments do have a problem and probably are stuck with an older midas version.
> 

Yes, there is a problem and some adjustment is needed.

I do not think the new URL scheme requires us to abandon existing experiments.

At this point I am trying to minimize the number of adjustments required, for example:

If we do not need to move files around (and create symlinks), it is good - so the old scheme of saving file names in ODB lives on
If we do not need to edit every file to adjust every URL, it is good - so now that http://blah/CS/custom_page is gone (no more "CS/"), http://blah/custom_page had to be implemented
If we do not need to replace all the ODB /Alias entries, http://blah/ODB_PATH now redirects to http://blah/?cmd=odb&odb_path=ODB_PATH and all the old aliases to ODB still work

I am going through these things as I discover them with Suzannah.

The biggest problem so far we have seen is with some pages having incorrect form submission
settings - some forms use the wrong form "action" attribute, which worked before, we do not know
why, and definitely does not work now. This is not something that we can fix on the midas side.

K.O.

> 
> That sounds fine, as long as it is clearly documented.
> 

I am a true believer in the two-man rule. One person writes the code, another person
documents it - this keeps everything honest and ensures that at least one
person (the documenter) understands what is going on. (as the coder, I can easily
write documentation that nobody understands, or that is completely wrong).

> > Third, the /Custom/Path should really go away.
> Yes, I agree that /Custom/Path should go away.

/Custom/Path as a resource search path or
/Custom/Path that is prepended to file names of old-style custom pages?

The second use is safe and does not need to be removed.

The first use is now redundant - files are now also served through send_resource()
through the normal resource path, that includes ODB /Experiment/Resource
(something that has been there for a long time).

K.O.

> The biggest problem so far we have seen is with some pages having incorrect form submission
> settings - some forms use the wrong form "action" attribute, which worked before, we do not know
> why, and definitely does not work now. This is not something that we can fix on the midas side.

Make sure you check any page which has a GIF image with bars and labels. I believe the new URL system has an issue there (mayby still an explicity /CS/... somewhere).

Stefan

> > The biggest problem so far we have seen is with some pages having incorrect form submission
> > settings - some forms use the wrong form "action" attribute, which worked before, we do not know
> > why, and definitely does not work now. This is not something that we can fix on the midas side.
> 
> Make sure you check any page which has a GIF image with bars and labels. I believe the new URL system has an issue there (mayby still an explicity /CS/... somewhere).
> 

Yes, we tried it with Suzannah and to my amazement it worked from the 1st try in her test experiment.

However the example in midas/examples/custom does not quite work, the gif file seems to be broken, displays as gibberish for me.

Also in the show_custom_page() I see code for "toggle" and "edit", but I have to example to test them.

K.O.

I now understand Stefan's and Thomas's proposal a little bit better.

In my mind only one issue remains - when we say "we will serve files from directory X", how
to we prevent mhttpd from serving files outside this directory by using trick URLs containing ".."
and/or other gimmicks.

The code I currently put in mhttpd, disallows multi-level URL path names (by rejecting names that contain the directory separator "/").

This has the effect of keeping the mhttpd URL space flat (without subdirectories).

http://localhost:8080/Status.html  <--- no multi level URLs like we used to have:
http://localhost:8080/CS/Custom.html <--- no more of these

Keeping the URL space restricted to one level is important if we do not want to defeat
the recent change to the mhttpd URL scheme - if mhttpd runs behind a proxy, without
a "Base URL" (which we just removed), we can only use relative URLs to navigate
between midas pages and if we permit multi-level URLs, it becomes hard to get
back to the status page without the ugly counting of ".." URL elements (which ugly and
brittle code we also just recently removed) (n.b. to navigate from CS/Custom.html
to the status page, one must redirect to "../Status.html").

But this whole beautiful cathedral falls apart from one valid use case: we want to serve "jsroot"
from a subdirectory called "jsroot" - this is how this package is packaged and we do not want
to mess with it just to make midas happy.

So at the least we must enable serving of multi-level URL path names to serve 3rd party packages.

The most trivial way out is to replace the URL check "/ is not permitted" with ".. is not permitted".

(One could also have a list of all permitted subdirectories in ODB, but this would be hard to use and 
difficult to implement. Not my favourite solution.)

This will break the flatness of the mhttpd URLs (no subdirectories). But maybe it is sufficient
to write down "do not do this!" and close with "wontfix" all bug reports about "my custom page
is at http://localhost:8080/mycustomdir/new/verynew/custom.html, how come the [status] button
does not take me back to the status page?".


K.O.

> Parsing all URL in mhttpd to prevent /etc/passwd etc. to be returned is tricky, because people can use escape sequences etc. Therefore I think it is much better to restrict file access 
> on the file system level when opening a file. The only escape there one could have is "..", which can be tested easily. 
> 
> Therefore, I propose to restrict file access to two well-defined directories, which is one system directory and one user directory. The system directory should be defined via 
> $MIDASSYS/resources, and the user directory should be the experiment directory (as defined in exptab) followed by "resources". So if MIDASSYS equals to /usr/local/midas and the 
> experiment directory equals to /home/users/exp for example, we would only have these two directories (and of course the subdirectories within these) served by mhttpd:
> 
> $MIDASSYS/resource -> /usr/local/midas/resources
> <exptab>/resources -> /home/users/exp/resources
> 
> These directories should be hard-wired into mhttpd, and not go through and ODB entry, since otherwise one could manipulate the ODB entries (knowingly or unknowingly) and open a 
> back-door. 
> 
> If users need a more complex structure, they can put soft links into these directories.
> 
> The code which opens a resource file should then first evaluate $MIDASSYS, then add "/resources/", then add the requested file name, make sure that there is no ".." in the file name, 
> then open the file. If not existing, do the same for the <exptab>/resources/ directory.
> 
> This change will break most experiments, and forces people to move their custom pages to different directories, but I think it's the only clean solution and we just have to bite the 
> bullet.
> 
> Comments are welcome.
> 
> Stefan

> In my mind only one issue remains - when we say "we will serve files from directory X", how
> to we prevent mhttpd from serving files outside this directory by using trick URLs containing ".."
> and/or other gimmicks.
> 
> Disallow multi-level URL path names (by rejecting names that contain the directory separator "/").
> Replace the URL check "/ is not permitted" with ".. is not permitted".
> 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directory_traversal_attack

K.O.

> > In my mind only one issue remains - when we say "we will serve files from directory X", how
> > to we prevent mhttpd from serving files outside this directory by using trick URLs containing ".."
> > and/or other gimmicks.
> > 
> > Disallow multi-level URL path names (by rejecting names that contain the directory separator "/").
> > Replace the URL check "/ is not permitted" with ".. is not permitted".
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directory_traversal_attack

and, from Mitre's "Common Weakness Enumeration", with examples:

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html

K.O.

> In my mind only one issue remains - when we say "we will serve files from directory X", how
> to we prevent mhttpd from serving files outside this directory by using trick URLs containing ".."
> and/or other gimmicks.
> 
> So at the least we must enable serving of multi-level URL path names to serve 3rd party packages.
> 
> The most trivial way out is to replace the URL check "/ is not permitted" with ".. is not permitted".
> 

This change is "in". commit https://bitbucket.org/tmidas/midas/commits/b231d10b5816c14428a69ee97b16f6fee7819367

mhttpd should be able to serve "jsroot" and other 3rd packages now.

K.O.

> Before the days of javascript and ajax and web 2.0, MIDAS introduced "custom pages" for
> building graphical display that could show "live" data from MIDAS and that could
> have buttons and controls to operate slow controls equipment, etc.

As summary of latest gyrations, this is how mhttpd can be used to serve custom pages:

a) old custom pages path:

?cmd=custom&page=XXX serves filename contained in ODB /Custom/XXX if it exists. Value of ODB /Custom/Path is prepended to the filename unless it already starts with a "/"

b) alternate custom pages path:

if ODB /Custom/URL or /Custom/URL& or /Custom/URL! exist, serves filename contained in corresponding ODB entry. Again value of ODB /Custom/Path is prepended to the filename 
unless it already starts with a "/".

In both cases, ".." is not permitted in the custom page name to avoid ODB path traversal attack (escape from /Custom subdirectory by using custom page names like "../System/blah").

c) new custom page path:

if ODB /Custom/Path exists and is not empty, it is prepended to the URL and this forms the filename (ODB[/Custom/Path] + "/" + URL). If this file exists, it is served. To prevent directory 
traversal attacks, ".." is not permitted in the URL.

d) resource search path:

file given by the URL is searched in the resource search path (see "resource paths" on the mhttpd help page, typically $MIDASSYS/resources, etc), e.g.
http://localhost:8080/status.html -> serves $MIDASSYS/resources/status.html.

this is the normal way to serve all standard midas web pages.

to (a) prevent directory traversal attack and (b) enforce flat namespace (no URL subdirectories), send_resource() disallows "/" (and "\" on Windows) anywhere in the filename.

Notes:

1) path traversal attacks are detailed here, MIDAS is subject to both filesystem and ODB path traversal attacks.
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html

2) methods (c) and (d) are duplicative. In the next rework of mhttpd (update of mongoose library, update of multithreading,
update of web server configuration in ODB, etc), we will probably change serving of custom files along the lines
proposed by Stefan and Thomas.

3) the "old custom pages" code will most likely remain as is: it works with the new url scheme, it does not suffer from path traversal attacks and it is still used by some experiments.

K.O.

Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "runtest.py", line 42, in <module>
    import midas
  File "/opt/MIDAS.PSI/Resources/PyMIDAS/pymidas/midas/__init__.py", line 140, in
<module>
    cmidas = ctypes.cdll.LoadLibrary('libmidas.so')
  File "/usr/lib/python2.5/site-packages/PIL/__init__.py", line 431, in LoadLibrary
    
  File "/usr/lib/python2.5/site-packages/PIL/__init__.py", line 348, in __init__
    
OSError: /opt/MIDAS.PSI/Versions/Current/lib/libmidas.so: undefined symbol:
cam16i_rq

When we run the following commands on the hostname(DAQ machine) and the remote
frontend(Rpi):
cd $HOME/online
cp $MIDASSYS/examples/experiment/* .
make

We get errors such as
=================
On Rpi:
pi@raspberrypi:~/online/fe_test $ make
...
Missing definition of environment variable 'ROOTSYS' !

=================
On host machine
inking CXX executable frontend
/usr/bin/ld: cannot find -lmfe
/usr/bin/ld: cannot find -lmidas
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make[2]: *** [frontend] Error 1
make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/frontend.dir/all] Error 2
make: *** [all] Error 2


The Rpi(32bit) doesn't have root installed but the host machine(64bit) does.
What can we do to fix this?

Thank you this forum has been of great help.

If the latest midas does not work, try the previous release versions. "git tags" and "git branch -
a" will show you what exists. Look for branch and tag names in the form "midas-YYYY-MM".

As shortcut, the latest release candidate is midas-2019-06, the latest release branch is midas-
2019-03, latest release tag midas-2019-03-h.

Read the messages in this thread for more information:
https://midas.triumf.ca/elog/Midas/1513

>
> When we run the following commands ...
> make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/frontend.dir/all] Error 2
>

I do not understand cmake well enough to debug this. Falling back to midas-2019-03 may help 
you as it uses normal make and with luck you know how to debug normal Makefiles if you see 
the same problem.

K.O.

Note that the example experiment compiles a simple example frontend and a root-based analyzer. If you don't have 
ROOT installed, you of course cannot compile the analyzer. If you don't need the analyzer, remove it from the 
Makefile/CMakeLists.txt

It's not clear to me why the frontend did not compile on our server machine. You did not post the command how you 
initiated the build. Note that there are now two parallel build schemes: the traditional Makefile and the new 
CMakeFiles.txt. We try to maintain both of them, so you have to specify which one you use when you get an error.

I realize now that the CMakeLists.txt in the experiment example directory builds nicely under midas, but when you move 
it to another directory and extract it from the normal build scheme it breaks. I rewrote the CMakeLists.txt now that it 
looks for MIDASSYS and also build at different locations. Do

cd $HOME/online
cp $MIDASSYS/examples/experiment/* .
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ..
make

and it should work. Of course first pull the current develop version.

Stefan

I wrote a c++ frontend to read data from CAEN VX1730 digitizers which is used in
parallel with the GRIFFIN frontend to read out DESCANT.

After a long overnight run to check that the frontend runs smoothly for a longer
time, I stopped the run and the frontend was killed by midas. I am not sure why
this happened, as the end_of_run function returned successfully (at least the
print statement right before "return SUCCESS;" appeared right away). So
something else must have timed-out and caused it to be killed, I guess?

Any suggestions on where to look to find out what causes this?

Thanks in advance for your help!